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Abstract 
Traffic analysis and anomaly detection have been extensively used to 
characterize  network  utilization  as  well  as  to  identify  abnormal 
network traffic such as malicious attacks. However, so far, techniques 
for  traffic  analysis  and  anomaly  detection  have  been  carried  out 
independently, relying on mechanisms and algorithms either in edge 
or in  core  networks  alone.  In  this  paper  we  propose  the  notion  of 
multi-level  network  resilience,  in  order  to  provide  a  more  robust 
traffic  analysis  and  anomaly  detection  architecture,  combining 
mechanisms and algorithms operating in a coordinated fashion both 
in the edge and in the core networks. This work is motivated by the 
potential complementarities between the research being developed at 
IIT Madras and Lancaster University. In this paper we describe the 
current work being developed at IIT Madras and Lancaster on traffic 
analysis and anomaly detection, and outline the principles of a multi-
level resilience architecture. 
Keywords: 
Traffic  Analysis,  Core  and  Edge  Networks,  Network  Resilience, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Traffic analysis and anomaly detection are extensively used 
to understand and characterize network traffic behaviour, as well 
as to identify abnormal operational conditions such as malicious 
attacks.  However,  techniques  for  traffic  analysis  and  anomaly 
detection  are  typically  carried  out  independently  in  different 
parts of the network, either in the edge or in the core networks 
alone. In fact, different traffic characteristics and anomalies can 
normally be better observed in a specific part of the network, 
although they affect the network as a whole. In this paper, we 
advocate  that  a  comprehensive  architecture  for  network 
resilience must combine traffic analysis and anomaly detection 
mechanisms and algorithms deployed both in the core and edge 
networks,  thus  introducing  the  notion  of  multi-level  network 
resilience. 
This work is motivated by the potential complementarities 
between  the  research  being  developed  at  IIT  Madras  and 
Lancaster  University.  On  the  one  hand,  researchers  at  IIT 
Madras  have  concentrated  on  traffic  analysis  and  anomaly 
detection at the edge of the network, monitoring and measuring 
Internet traffic at web server proxies. In addition to prediction of 
network  attacks  based  on  SYN  flooding,  overall  traffic  and 
individual user’s traffic behaviour is also monitored, in order to 
classify,  predict  and  control  user  bandwidth  using  ARIMA 
timeseries  models  of  network  usage.  On  the  other  hand, 
Lancaster University has focused on the classification of attack-
related  traffic  in  core  networks,  in  terms  of  volume-based 
detection  of  anomalies.  The  applicability  of  energy  Time-
Frequency distributions alongside the use of Renyi information 
has been  utilized for distinguishing  malicious traffic  from the 
rest of application-layer protocols as seen on the transport layer 
of a core network. 
Both  Lancaster  and  IIT  Madras  are  looking  at  similar 
machine-learning  algorithms  for  anomaly  detection,  traffic 
shaping  and  prediction.  IIT  Madras’  approach  is  interesting 
since there are computational resources available at the edge of 
the  network  to  perform  efficiently  algorithms  for  anomaly 
detection. However, considering anomaly detection only at the 
end  node  is  limiting  since  it  only  observes  the  effects  on 
particular end-systems at the edge of the network but does not 
consider  the  effects  on  the  network  itself.  Particularly  with 
multiple,  coordinated  attacks  the  network  might  be  the  actual 
target of the attacker rather than any specific services. Therefore, 
detection  should  be  done  as  early  as  possible,  alongside  the 
network, to increase the evidence and to detect anomalies in a 
more coordinated manner. This is in line with recent trends in 
network-wide and backbone anomaly detection research.  
Hence the proposed joint work on multi-level resilience is 
timely and current. There is a good potential for collaboration in 
investigating the effects, results and benefits of both approaches 
combined.  This  papers  presents  an  initial  investigation  on  an 
integrated anomaly detection infrastructure, combining metrics 
and mechanisms from both edge and core networks. 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes our 
independent work in traffic analysis and anomaly detection, both 
in the core and in the edge networks, presenting the mechanisms 
and the algorithms that we intend to integrate in order to realise 
the notion of multi-level network resilience. Section 3 outlines 
the simulation platform that will permit the evaluation of multi-
level network resilience strategies. Section 4 briefly describes a 
case study scenario that is used to illustrate the ideas presented 
in this paper. Finally, Section 5 presents our concluding remarks. 
2. CORE  NETWORKS  AND  EDGE 
NETWORKS OBSERVATIONS  
2.1  TRAFFIC ANALYSIS IN CORE NETWORKS 
Network  backbone  link  traffic  exhibits  dynamic 
characteristics which are classified as highly non-stationary due 
to their non-constant instantaneous frequency and group delay 
on the Time-Frequency (TF) plane [7]. Under the intention of 
characterizing these dynamics we found as most appropriate to 
exploit the capabilities provided by energy distributions and we ANGELOS MARNERIDES et al.: MULTI-LEVEL NETWORK RESILIENCE: TRAFFIC ANALYSIS, ANOMALY DETECTION AND SIMULATION 
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have particularly employed formulations belonging in the Cohen 
class of distributions [8]. In particular, we assessed the task of 
application-layer  classification  with  the  utilization  of 
meaningful,  discriminative  metrics  extracted  from  the  Choi-
Williams  distribution  [9].    These  metrics  were  used  as  the 
numerical  features  for  our  tree-based  classification  as  being 
provided within the treefit() and classregtree() MATLAB utility 
functions.  
 Our analysis was based upon the independent evaluation and 
observation of the transport protocol’s (i.e. TCP, UDP) volume-
wise  behaviour  (i.e.  counts  of  packets  and  bytes  per 
unidirectional  flow)  with  respect  to  their  utilization  from  the 
application protocols/clients. The operational network trace used 
was  an  hour  long  sample  captured  at  the  Samplepoint-B 
backbone link of the WIDE network and provided by the Mawi 
working group [10]. 
2.1.1.  Cohen-Based  Energy  Distribution  and  the  Choi-
Williams Formulation: 
One  of  the  main  problems  occurring  in  TF  energy 
representations  is  that  many  functions  developed  under  the 
”energy” concept generating such distributions include complex 
and  negative  values.  Even  though  authors  in  [8]  support  the 
incentive  of  employing  a  TF  energy  distribution  function  by 
having  a  signal  under  its  analytical  form  they  argue  that  the 
resulting  distributions  cannot  be  considered  as  proper 
probabilities for real valued signals. Due to the aforementioned 
drawback, Cohen in [11] complementing the work by Wigner 
formulated  an  initial  generic  method  to  generate  a  range  of 
functions  which  can  satisfy  the  marginal  properties  which 
enabled the acquisition of positive distributions. 
If we let our signal be s(t) and its analytical form be s(u), the 
representation of the Cohen class of distributions is formulated 
as: 
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where (,), is a two-dimensional kernel function determining 
the specific distribution on a given signal and should satisfy: 
1 ) 0 , ( ) 0 , (                                                              (2) 
 Under  their  intention  of  attenuating  cross  and  self  terms 
initiated  by  a  signal  on  the  TF  plane  Choi  and  Williams  in 
devised  a  Cohen-based  distribution  which  intuitively  (and  in 
many cases in practice) satisfies up to a high level of accuracy 
the  description  of  a  signal’s  energy  concentration  on  the  TF 
plane.  The  initial  approach  by  Choi  and  Williams  was  to 
consider a signal s(t) constructed by a number of components:  
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By  substituting  the  above  definition  in  the  general  Cohen 
class  of  distributions  equation  (i.e.  formula  1)  we  obtain  a 
resulting distribution which is composed by the sum of self and 
cross  terms  as  naturally  evolved  by  frequency  scaling  on  the 
signal  itself  alongside  the  cross -scaling  triggered  by  the 
individual signal components. 
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The  sum  of  cross  terms Mai(t,) always under the general 
Cohen equation (formula 1) is represented as: 
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In  parallel  with  their  intention  of  exploring  distributions 
under the notions of self and cross terms, Choi and Williams 
realized that interference terms would be greatly reduced with a 
choice of a particular kernel function for  (,).  This  kernel 
function would minimize the cross terms and at the same time 
retain the desirable properties of the self terms.  By investigating 
the local autocorrelation function as well as using the ambiguity 
concept their finalized kernel method was derived as: 
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where  is a constant and is the core variable for controlling the 
suppression of the signal’s cross terms and frequency resolution. 
Using formulas 1, 4, 5, 6 and after per- integration the resulting 
Choi-Williams distribution is:   
     
 




   




   
     
  

    dud u s u s e t CW
j u
2
1
2
1
/
1
4
1
) , (
/ 4 /
2 2 / 3
2 2
   
                                                                                        (7)
 
The Choi-Williams (CW) distribution was the mean for 
mapping the measurements obtained for the packet/byte time 
series as se en from each transport protocol. In parallel they 
constituted towards the generation of the Renyi information 
which  it  was  used  as  the  basic  discriminative  feature  for 
classifying our application-signals. 
2.1.2.  Renyi Information: 
According to generic information-theoretical principles, the 
extraction and measurement of information on the TF plane can 
be easily achieved with the utilization of the (always positive) 
spectrogram and the well known Shannon entropy. Nevertheless, 
in  virtue  of  the  resolution  trade-off  [12]  and  bias  of  the 
spectrogram it is quite disadvantageous to employ it on any of 
the Cohen-based TF distributions. In parallel, due to the negative 
values  present  in  some  of  these  distributions  it  is  also  quite 
inefficient to apply the Shannon’s entropy for gaining valuable 
information with respect with the complexity of a given signal 
on the TF plane.    
However,  information-theoretic  and  signal  processing 
literature  [14],  suggest  the  3
rd  order  Renyi  entropy  (in  some 
cases  also  called  as  dimension)  as  one  of  the  most  accurate 
methods  for  interpreting  a  signal’s  complexity.  The  notion  of 
complexity is mapped as the number of elementary components 
composing  the  main  signal  and  is  measured  in  bits.  In  our 
elementary  independent  components  in  our  signal  are 
corresponding to large deviations from the average packet/byte 
count.  Therefore,  a  large  positive-valued  Renyi  information 
value in bits shows that our signal has high complexity and it is 
composed by a number of components which significantly differ 
numerically from the average byte/pkts count on the TF plane. ISSN: 2229-6948(ONLINE)                                  ICTACT JOURNAL ON COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY: SPECIAL ISSUE ON NEXT GENERATION WIRELESS NETWORKS AND 
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Fig.1. Tree-based application classification under the CW distribution for WIDE on TCP-packets 
The  generalized  Renyi  information  in  contrast  with  the 
Shannon  entropy  information  is  a  formulation  that  accepts 
negative values within the under analysis energy TF distribution 
and is defined as: 
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As shown in formula 8, the generalized Renyi information is 
dependent upon the tuning variable a that determines the order 
of the Renyi entropy. In the case of 1
st order Renyi entropy, we 
recover  the  Shannon  entropy  and  the  Kullback-Leibler 
divergence  and  as  mentioned  earlier  it  is  inefficient  to  use  it 
particularly on any Cohen-based TF distribution. Furthermore, 
the case of a = 2 is ruled out since according to [1]a.[11] the 
term   

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type  of  signal.  Thus,  for  the  specific  case  of  Cohen -based  TF 
distributions  it  suggested  for a    3  and  by  employing  it  on 
formula 8 we obtain: 
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Formula 9 enabled our experimentation to determine distinct 
complexity  measurements  for  particular  Internet  applications 
and alongside the TF moments  we  were able to construct a 
feature set for each of the observational datasets and use them 
within our tree-based categorization.  The evaluation presented 
within  this  document  describes  mainly  the  packet -based 
application-classification.  
2.1.3.  Classifying Applications on WIDE Based Upon the TCP 
Packet-Based Utilization: 
The hour long trace from WIDE was broken in to 4 equal 
bins (i.e. WIDE-I, II, III and IV) of 13.75 minutes each.   
Using  the  behavioral  and  port-based  extraction  scheme 
provided  by  the  work  done  in  BLINC  [1]a.[12]  we  initially 
extracted the counts of packets associated with TCP and then 
associated each application with its packet-based utilization. A 
subsequent process was to compute the CW distribution for each 
distinct application and further estimate the Renyi information 
provided by each. Specifically we used the sample of WIDE-I as 
a training set and the remaining samples as the testing sets in our 
classification.   
As  Fig.1  illustrates  our  simple  tree-based  classification 
provided ranks for every application present within the WIDE 
trace and assigned complexity ranks to each.  
Apparently, from a bytes and packets perspective, the most 
complex  signal  which  is  structured  by  intensive  flows  is  the 
traffic triggered by unknown applications (i.e. R<527.135). Even 
though this particular traffic category didn’t exhibit the largest 
amount  of  unidirectional  flows  it  contained  unknown 
applications that were frequently observed throughout the whole ANGELOS MARNERIDES et al.: MULTI-LEVEL NETWORK RESILIENCE: TRAFFIC ANALYSIS, ANOMALY DETECTION AND SIMULATION 
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WIDE trace and most of them consumed a considerable portion 
of  TCP  from  a  packets  perspective.  Following  the  lead  of 
unknown traffic and second in rank was as anticipated the HTTP 
protocol. As being the dependency for the most commonly used 
applications (e.g. WWW), HTTP had volume-wise the biggest 
amount  of  flows  but  its  transmissions  on  average  were  not 
largely intensive from a packets and bytes perspective. We argue 
that one of the main reasons of being ranked as highly complex 
in  this  case  is  due  to  its  enormously  big  sample  size  in 
comparison with the rest of the extracted application protocols. 
Apart from that, there were obviously transmissions associated 
with  certain  applications  (e.g.  Apache  HTTP  servers)  that 
demonstrated  extremely  high  TCP  utilization  from  a  packets 
perspective.  However,  we  can  generally  conclude  that  HTTP-
based  applications  throughout  the  WIDE  trace  exhibited 
individually  a  higher  number  of  packets  per  flow  rather  than 
being flows with fewer packets determined by big byte sizes.   
SMB resides as well in the high valued Renyi branches (i.e. 
R<107.763)  indicating  its  frequent  appearance  in  the  WIDE 
trace overall. Its placement in this level of complexity indicates 
that  SMB-related  applications  are  volume-wise  consuming  in 
both TCP packets and bytes. In addition, as similarly observed in 
the  Keio  networks,  this  high  SMB  utilization  is  supportive 
evidence in the argument that the majority of users in the WIDE 
network were running MS-Windows.  Leaving aside SMB, we 
also noticed high packet-wise utilization from SMTP-based mail 
as well as with SSH. Based upon the byte-based rankings, SMTP 
was expected to be categorized as highly complex and intensive 
but on the other it was intriguing the classification achieved for 
SSH.  Via  this  packet-based  categorization  we  could  get  an 
insight  related  with  SSH-related  transmissions  and  summarize 
that SSH unidirectional flows are much more intensive from a 
packets perspective. Subsequent intensive application protocols 
in  the  branches  where  R<70.5613  were  expected  protocols 
involved with network operations (i.e. NetBIOS), DNS, attack-
related  traffic  particularly  on  ports  135  and  1025,  as  well  as 
secured HTTP connections (i.e. HTTPS). 
Possessing a noteworthy amount of TCP packet-wise traffic 
was a TCP utility protocol that of Ident (R<15.1322) which was 
followed  by  intensive  chat  applications  such  as  Yahoo! 
Messenger and MSN. Furthermore, file transfers through FTP 
alongside P2P distribution platforms like Bittorrent, PeerEnabler 
and DirectConnect were noticed to use a significant amount of 
TCP packets in each of their flows.  Going to lower branches we 
see  rankings  of  medium  complexities  (i.e.  R<11.4406)  to  be 
assigned in a variety of applications dealing with P2P (eDonkey, 
FastTrack), live streaming with QuickTime and POP-based mail. 
Relatively  having  slightly  less  volume  and  complexity-wise 
significance  were  applications  in  the  even  lower  branch  (i.e. 
R<9.0609) indicating their occasional utilization such as IMAP-
based  mail,  chat  through  AOL’s  Messenger  (i.e.  AIM), 
encrypted IMAP `mail, P2P traffic via Gnutella and Limewire as 
well as internet live streaming through Shoutcast and MMS.  Of 
lesser  importance  with  respect  to  their  Renyi  estimates  (i.e. 
R<7.40135) were traditionally UDP-based applications such as 
P2P distribution platforms such as OpenNapster, GoBoogy and 
SoulSeek and Yahoo! Messenger’s video utilities. Similarly with 
the  byte-based  analysis,  Trojans  initiated  in  various  TCP 
destination  ports  indicated  an  insignificant  traffic  impact  with 
low packet complexity. In fact, the majority of identified Trojans 
and malicious flows carrying worms were associated with well 
known vulnerable TCP ports (e.g. 16, 27, 30, 68). Specifically 
the Trojans identified were those of Skunk, Backboor.Trojan and 
Assassin [1]a.[14].   
2.2  TRAFFIC ANALYSIS IN EDGE NETWORKS 
2.2.1.   Detection of DoS Attacks: 
Time series models are used for modeling and prediction of 
network  traffic.  Most  techniques  assume  stationarity  and 
predictability  of  the  given  series.  In  this  paper,  an  attempt  is 
made to analyse network traffic at an edge router in the context 
of TCP SYN based DoS (Denial of Service) attack, using linear 
time series models. The network feature studied in this paper is 
called the Half-Open Count discussed in Section 5.1.  Earlier 
work  [24]  on  this  feature  modeled  it  using  Auto-Regressive 
(AR) technique, for detection of TCP SYN based DoS (Denial 
of  Service)  attack  at  the  victim  server.  But,  some  of  the 
drawbacks of this approach are: stationarity and predictability of 
the time series data are not ensured, but rather assumed, as in the 
case of other related work [4] – [6]. Further, model coefficients 
are recomputed for every observation window of size 6 samples 
(with sampling interval of 10s), which slides over the time series 
one sample at a time. The recomputed coefficients are then used 
for prediction of the attack. This perhaps takes care of the non-
stationarity  in  the  data,  but  re-computation  of  coefficients  for 
every window of such small size may not be a good approach in 
terms of practical implementation.  
Internet being an extremely dynamic and constantly evolving 
system, it is   unlikely to find any feature that will be invariant 
across  all  networks  at  all  times.  Hence  the  solution  to  traffic 
modeling lies in performing suitable transformations on the half-
open time series. In particular, two transformations are discussed 
in this paper, namely differencing and averaging. The effect of 
these on the original series are studied and compared. Further, 
from the analysis, predictability of the time series is found to 
have  strong  correlation  with  Hurst  exponent,  Auto-correlation 
and Smoothness of the series. 
Data Set Used 
Network trace was collected over a period of three months 
from July 15th 2010 to September 30th 2010, from the TENET 
gateway  of  IIT  Madras,  using  TCPDUMP  tool  [25].  The 
gateway  connects  TENET  network  to  the  Internet.  The 
bandwidth  of  the  link  connecting  the  gateway  to  the  service 
provider is currently 4Mbps. From this trace, the difference in 
number  of  incoming  (traffic  entering  from  outside  network) 
SYN packets and number of outgoing (traffic leaving to outside 
network)  SYN-ACK  packets,  called  half-open  count,  are 
extracted  at  equally  spaced  time  intervals  of  10s.  For  the 
analysis, three data sets are created, each consisting of 5 days 
(i.e 24 hrs x 5 days) data, from Monday to Friday. These data 
sets  are  checked  for  any  existing  TCP  SYN  DoS  attack,  by 
verifying whether all the connection requests are valid. This is 
done  to  demonstrate  the  effectiveness  of  our  approach  in  the 
context of TCP SYN based DoS attack detection, discussed in 
Section 5.7. Since the detection algorithm works on the number 
of  half-open  connections,  it  will  scale  for  different  network 
sizes. 
 ISSN: 2229-6948(ONLINE)                                  ICTACT JOURNAL ON COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY: SPECIAL ISSUE ON NEXT GENERATION WIRELESS NETWORKS AND 
APPLICATIONS, JUNE 2011, VOLUME – 2, ISSUE – 2  
349 
Transformations of Time Series 
Three different time series of half-open feature are compared 
in  this  paper:  (a)  original,  (b)  difference  and  (c)  average.  To 
generate the difference series, absolute value of the difference 
for  consecutive  samples  is  computed.  This  is  also  called  first 
differencing  [26],  [27].  A  moving  average  function  of  the 
original time series using a sliding window of size 30 samples, 
with a one-sample shift, is computed, to form the average time 
series. 
Fig.1 (a) – (c) show the original, difference and average time 
series for the data set-1 for Monday and Thursday respectively. 
Similar trend is observed for other days. Couple of observations 
are worth  mentioning: First, the short time  variations (spikes) 
can be seen in the original and difference series, but are absent in 
the average series. Such frequent spikes hints that any threshold 
based techniques, like the ones discussed in [28], [29], to detect 
DoS attacks, may not work for these two cases. This is because 
it is highly unlikely that a model can be built which can predict 
frequent spikes accurately. Second, long term variations or trend 
present in the original series are removed in the difference series 
but retained in the average series. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Fig.2. (a) Original (b) Difference (c) Average time series for 
data set 1 
Stationarity Test 
A process is said to be wide-sense stationary if the mean and 
autocorrelation of the process are invariant over time. This is 
also  called  weak  stationarity  [26],  [27].  The  intuitive  idea  of 
checking stationarity is to ensure whether the model parameters 
estimated are time invariant. Table.1, Table.2 and Table.3 show 
the  mean  for  the  original,  difference  and  average  series 
respectively. It can be observed that the means vary across three 
data sets, for all the three time series. But the means within each 
data set, for all the three series, does not show much variation.   
Table.1. Mean of Original Series 
Day  I  II  III 
Mon  13.41  7.89  8.16 
Tue  11.43  8.15  6.7 
Wed  14.09  8.41  4.99 
Thur  14.37  8.44  4.71 
Fri  13.39  8.26  6.01 
Avg.  13.34  8.23  6.11 
Table.2. Mean of Difference Series 
Day  I  II  III 
Mon  5.54  5.04  4.84 
Tue  5.01  5.09  4.21 
Wed  5.64  5.18  3.78 
Thur  5.74  5.04  3.67 
Fri  5.37  5.27  3.99 
Avg.  5.46  5.12  4.1 
Table.3. Mean of Average Series 
Day  I  II  III 
Mon  13.43  7.89  8.16 
Tue  11.43  8.15  6.71 
Wed  14.1  8.41  4.99 
Thur  14.37  8.44  4.71 
Fri  13.39  8.26  6.01 
Avg.  13.34  8.23  6.11 
Fig.3.(a)-(c)  show  ACF  graphs  for  data  set-2,  plotted  for 
original,  difference  and  average  series  respectively,  which 
doesn't  show  much  variation  across  different  days  for  each 
series. Similar observations are seen for the other two data sets 
also.  This  indicates  that,  though  all  three  series  are  non-
stationary across data sets, it appears that all are quasi-stationary 
with window size of 5 days or perhaps a week. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Fig.3. ACF for (a) Original (b) Difference (c) Average series for 
data set 2 
Smoothness Factor 
Matthew Roughan et al in their work on modeling backbone 
traffic [30] have quantified the smoothness of the time series in 
terms of relative variance (variance divided by the mean).  If the 
relative  variance  is  low,  series  is  said  to  be  smooth  or  less 
bursty. Table.4 shows the smoothness computed for all the three 
transformations. Average series is found to be smooth compared 
to the other two series. 
Table.4. Smoothness 
Data Set  Original 
Series 
Difference 
Series 
Average 
Series 
I  8.41  12.26  3.55 
II  14.72  19.38  2.15 
III  10.61  17.14  2.42 
Hurst Exponent Estimation 
Hurst exponent (H) [31], [32] is a measure of the burstiness 
of the time series. Time series can be classified based on the H 
value as (1) H = 0.5, for white Gaussian noise, (2) 0 < H < 0.5, is 
a mean reverting and less bursty series and (3) 0.5 < H < 1, is a 
bursty and trend reinforcing series.  None of the Hurst estimators 
give correct value and often give conflicting results as indicated 
in [31], [32], [33]. For the analysis described in this paper, a 
software  package  called  SELFIS  [34]  is  used  for  estimating 
Hurst exponent. Out of the several estimators that were tried out, 
apart  from  the  rescaled  range  estimator  (r/s  method),  other 
estimators show conflicting results and sometimes Hurst values 
outside the range, 0 to 1. Hence, Hurst estimation based on r/s 
method  is  used  along  with  smoothening  factor  discussed  in 
Section 5.4, to arrive at a meaningful conclusion. Details of r/s 
estimation  are  discussed  in  [33].  Table.5  shows  the  Hurst 
exponent values for the original, difference and average series. It 
can  be  observed  that  the  Hurst  values  for  the  original  and 
difference series are higher than the average series.  This shows 
that the average series is less bursty and smoother than the other 
two series. Also, there is no significant difference between Hurst 
exponent of original and difference series. 
Table.5. Hurst Values 
Data Set  Original 
Series 
Difference 
Series 
Average 
Series 
I  0.71  0.62  0.44 
II  0.59  0.56  0.42 
III  0.62  0.57  0.42 
Modeling and Prediction 
In order to study the predictability of the series, each data set 
is considered stationary since the mean and auto- correlation are 
relatively constant within each data set as discussed in Section 
5.3. Auto-Regressive model discussed in [26], [27], is used to 
build the model using traffic on 1st day and predict the 5th day’s 
traffic. It is observed experimentally that model order of 2 is a 
good  value  for  prediction.  Note  that,  for  each  transformation, 
three models need to be built, one for each data set. Estimation 
of  AR  model  coefficients  are  done  by  Yule-Walker  method 
discussed  in  [26],  [27].    Average  relative  prediction  error  is 
shown  in  Table.6.  Relative  error  is  computed  by  normalising 
prediction  error  with  the  actual  value  for  every  sample  value 
predicted. 
Fig.4 shows the actual and predicted time series for all the 
three  transformations  of  data  set-1.  It  shows  larger  prediction 
error  for  the  original  and  difference  series  compared  to  the 
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sets as well. It can be concluded from Table.6 and Fig.4 that the 
average  series,  which  has retained the  trend and removed the 
short-term variations or spikes from the original series, is more 
predictable than the other two.  Also, it may be noted that the 
relative error for the difference series is more than the original 
series,  which  means  that  differencing  has  made  the  original 
series less predictable. 
Table.6. Average Relative Error 
Data Set  Original 
Series 
Difference 
Series 
Average 
Series 
I  0.46  0.90  0.01 
II  0.78  0.85  0.02 
III  0.77  0.87  0.03 
 
 
Fig.4. Actual vs Predicted for Original, Difference and Average 
Series for data set 1 
Detection of Attack 
A  trace  driven  low  rate  TCP  SYN  based  DoS  attack  is 
simulated by generating SYN packets with spoofed unreachable 
IP  addresses  to  a  victim  server.  Rate  of  the  attack  is  varied 
uniformly from 10 to 20 SYN/second. Duration of the attack is 5 
minutes.  Traffic  trace  at  the  victim  server  is  collected  and  is 
mixed with normal traffic of 5th day of each data set to generate 
the  attack  traffic.  The  experiment  is  repeated  for  10  times. 
Model is built on the average time series and tested to predict the 
attack  traffic.    The  relatively  large  prediction  error  during  an 
attack  can  be  utilised  for  detecting  the  attack  by  fixing  a 
threshold on the prediction error. Fig.5 shows the probability of 
wrongly detecting an attack called False Positive (FP) and the 
probability of not detecting an attack called False Negative (FN) 
for  various  threshold  values.    It  is  found  that  for  a  threshold 
value  as  0.4,  there  is  0%  FN  and  3%  FP.  The  worst-case 
detection delay is 5 minutes taking into account the window size 
of  30  samples  for  building  the  average  series  and  sampling 
interval of 10s. 
 
Fig.5. False Positive Vs False Negative 
Discussion 
Most  time  series  analysis  of  network  data  assumes 
stationarity  and  predictability  of  the  given  series.  But  the 
analysis has shown that such assumptions may not be valid at all 
times.  Also,  various  transformations  on  the  time  series  are 
studied  and  compared.  It  is  found  that  appropriate 
transformations on the series can lead to linear models and good 
prediction. Predictability of a series is found to have increased 
with slowly decaying ACF, low Hurst exponent value and low 
relative variance. Detection of low rate TCP SYN DoS attack is 
demonstrated with 3% false positive for detecting all the attacks. 
Since  the  solution  is  applied  at  the  edge  router  of  the  victim 
server and is based on the number of half-open connections, it is 
scalable to Distributed DoS attack as well. 
2.2.2.  Prediction and Control of Bandwidth: 
A  frequent  and  commonly  occurring  phenomenon  in  any 
network is the excessive use of bandwidth by a select group of 
users.  Analysis  of  IITM proxy  server  logs  shows  that  (Fig.6) 
upper band users who constitute less than 10% of users consume 
about  40%  of  the  traffic,  roughly  following  the  Pareto 
distribution. It is commonly observed that even though the LAN 
has a dedicated high-speed link to the ISP, during peak hours, 
poor response times are observed by Internet users. Abnormal 
use may be treated as a special case of an anomaly. We therefore ANGELOS MARNERIDES et al.: MULTI-LEVEL NETWORK RESILIENCE: TRAFFIC ANALYSIS, ANOMALY DETECTION AND SIMULATION 
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propose the framework shown in Fig.7 for detection and control 
of excessive bandwidth usage.  We first monitor user activity, 
and based on this we generate models for predicting bandwidth 
usage for each user. The training of the models may be done 
once a month,  while prediction  may be performed on a daily 
basis. Then, we predict bandwidth usage, which may be used to 
categorize each user as belonging to one of three categories – 
high,  middle  or  low  bandwidth  users.  A  suitable  control 
algorithm  may  be  implemented  in  order  to  control  abnormal 
usage. 
 
 
Fig.6. Distribution of users (top) and traffic generated by each 
category (bottom) 
 
Fig.7. Framework for Bandwidth Prediction and Control 
Time  series  models  have  to  offer  many  benefits  for 
predicting  values  at  discrete  intervals  of  time.  Firstly,  they 
handle well sudden (erroneous) spikes in the data and prevent 
them from affecting the forecast. Secondly, they automatically 
adjust to the current trend in the values – which may be caused 
by changes in the environment – for example – the unavailability 
of a link to the ISP, which may in turn affect bandwidth usage. 
Thus,  we  have  chosen  time  series  models  for  modeling 
bandwidth usage.  
Predicting Bandwidth Usage 
A  plot  of  the  autocorrelation  and  partial  autocorrelation 
functions (Fig.8(a) and (b)) for the original series as well as the 
first and second difference show that the plots tail off quickly, 
suggesting that the data is stationary, and so time series models 
may be used. 
All  our  experiments  were  carried  out  using  Squid  Proxy 
Server  logs  for  the  month  of  January  and  February  2009. 
January  data  was  used  for  training  –  i.e.  computing  model 
coefficients, and February data was used during the testing phase 
to compute the error between the forecast and actual values. The 
features we have considered are number of HTTP requests and 
number of bytes received for a particular user. Each sample data 
point in our case consists of the value of a feature (e.g. number 
of HTTP requests) accumulated over a period of two hours.  We 
performed the following experiments: 
1.  Static  Coefficients:  Coefficients  computed  during  the 
training phase were kept constant right through the testing 
phase. 
2.  Dynamic Coefficients:  Coefficients were re-computed each 
time for forecasting the next value in the testing phase. 
3.  Common  Model  for  each  Category:    Common  model 
coefficients  were  computed  for  each  category  (e.g.  high 
band users) and forecasting performed using this common 
model for all users. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig.8(a) Auto-correlation function and (b) Partial Auto-
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These  experiments  were  carried  out  using  AR,  ARI, 
ARMA and ARIMA time series models for the same data set. 
The  average  relative  error  was  computed  as  the  error  in 
prediction normalized by the actual data value. This was used to 
compare the predictive capability of the different models. 
The results indicate that there is no substantial difference 
between  the  performance  of  the  static  coefficients  model  and 
dynamic  coefficients  model.  However,  the  static  coefficients 
model performed better than the common model. The results for 
static coefficients across different models have been shown in 
Table.7.  Best  forecasting  is  obtained  for  ARI  and  ARIMA 
models. 
Table.7. Comparison of Different Time Series Models 
Model 
Average  relative 
error  for  no  of 
bytes 
Average  relative 
error  for  no  of 
requests 
AR  2.06  0.86 
ARI  0.52  0.51 
ARMA  1.6  0.88 
ARIMA  0.49  0.49 
Entropy-Based Scheme for Classification 
Entropy also seems to be a promising alternative means of 
analysing user access patterns. We may define for example the 
normalized entropy as 
     
    U
u P u P
= H U u
log
log   
  
where  U is the set of URLs accessed by a user. If the user 
typically  has  few  frequently  accessed  sites,  his  normalized 
entropy value would be low, whereas if he typically accesses a 
large number of URLs as in the case of a high band user, his 
normalized  entropy  value  would  be  high.  Fig.9  shows  the 
distribution of users for different values of normalized entropy. 
 
Fig.9. Distribution of Users for Different Normalized Entropy 
Ranges 
We would like to propose as a future direction the use of 
information-theoretic criteria to design a full-fledged classification 
scheme. 
3. SIMULATION PLATFORM 
It  is  difficult  to  evaluate  complex  multi-level  resilience 
strategies  that  involve  the  interplay  between  a  number  of 
detection and remediation mechanisms both at the core and edge 
networks,  which  must  be  activated  on  demand  according  to 
events  observed  in  the  network  (as  opposed  to  hardcoded 
protocols).  In  order  to  evaluate  such  resilience  strategies  we 
have previously proposed the notion of a policy-driven resilience 
simulator [1], based on the integration of a network simulator 
and a policy management framework. The toolset allows the use 
of  policies  to  specify  the  required  management  actions  to  be 
performed, according to conditions observed during run-time in 
the  simulation.  The  use  of  policies  for  the  specification  of 
resilience  strategies  was  previously  described  in  [2].  For 
example, the policy shown Fig.10 can be used to reconfigure a 
rate-limiting component based on the occurrence of a high risk 
event (raised, for example, by an anomaly detection component) 
and additional contextual information, e.g. the current utilisation 
on a specific link. 
on AnomalyDetectorMO . highRisk ( link , src , dst )  
if (LinkMonitorMO. getUtilisation () >= 75%) 
                do RateLimiterMO . limit ( link , 60%) 
Fig.10. Management policy for reconfiguring a rate limiter 
component based on a high-risk event 
One of the direct benefits of integrating a network simulator 
with  a  policy  framework  is  that  we  can  understand  how  real 
policies  dynamically  affect  the  operation  of  resilience 
mechanisms  running  within  the  simulation  environment,  and 
then evaluate resilience strategies before they are deployed in the 
network infrastructure. This permits the evaluation of complex 
resilience  strategies  without  the  need  of  a  real  testbed 
deployment of mechanisms, which typically involves high costs 
of  hardware  and  effort.  The  next  sections  briefly  outline  the 
design  of  the  simulation  platform  and  give  details  about  our 
prototype implementation. 
3.1   DESIGN ISSUES 
The resilience simulation platform is primarily based on the 
integration  between  a  network  simulator  and  a  policy 
management  framework.  In  [16],  a  number  of  techniques  for 
integrating a network simulator environment and external third 
party applications were compared: (a) socket connection relies 
on proxies  within the simulation that  maintain connections  to 
third party applications, without incurring major changes to the 
third  party  application.  This  technique,  however,  may  suffer 
from  CPU  scheduling  problems  because  simulations  typically 
run faster than the integrated third-party application; (b) source 
code integration can be straightforward for simple applications, 
but  it  is  difficult  to  be  implemented  for  larger  applications 
because  of  build  dependencies  that  must  be  resolved. 
Furthermore, threads in the third party application can still suffer 
from CPU scheduling issues and cause problems such as access 
violations; finally, (c) shared libraries is similar to source code 
integration, but is based on the integration between the simulator 
and the binary code of the third party application. This avoids 
the  problems  related  to  the  building  process,  however,  it  still 
suffers from the threading and timing problems. ANGELOS MARNERIDES et al.: MULTI-LEVEL NETWORK RESILIENCE: TRAFFIC ANALYSIS, ANOMALY DETECTION AND SIMULATION 
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The  integration  technique  used  in  our  prototype 
implementation  is  based  on  proxies,  similar  to  the  socket 
connection  method,  but  using  RMI/RPC  objects  instead. 
Typically, this technique can be used if data from lower layer 
protocols is not exchanged  with the external application [16]. 
For the resilience simulation platform, it is expected that CPU 
scheduling and synchronisation issues can be minimised because 
packet-level  information  is  not  exchanged  with  the  policy 
framework.  Instead,  exchanges  are  limited  to  selected  control 
events and the corresponding management commands alone. 
We  have  considered  the  use  of  the  most  popular  network 
simulators,  including  NS-2  [18],  NS-3  [19],  OMNeT++  [20], 
SSFNet  [21]  and  OPNET  [22].  The  choice  of  a  network 
simulator was driven by a number of requirements, including (i) 
the ability to extend and instrument the simulation tool, (ii) the 
availability  of  a  large  number  of  network  models,  (iii)  the 
scalability and performance of the simulator, and (iv) the ability 
of the simulator to model different types of networks. After an 
initial evaluation we discarded OPNET as it is a commercial tool 
and  the  source  code  for  its  simulation  kernel  is  not  publicly 
available,  and  NS-2  due  to  recurring  reports  of  its  poor 
scalability.  We  considered  NS-3,  OMNeT++  and  SSFNet 
equally suitable for our requirements, but due to our previous 
experience with SSFNet and familiarity with its API the initial 
implementation  described  in  [1]  is  based  on  this  simulator. 
Recently,  we  have  ported  this  prototype  to  an  OMNeT++ 
implementation, since OMNeT++ is considered one of the most 
popular simulators for research in communication networks. 
3.2  PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION 
The  prototype  is  based  on  the  integration  between  the 
network  simulator  and  the  Ponder2  policy  framework  [23]. 
Ponder2 implements a policy execution framework that supports 
the  enforcement  of  event-condition-action  (ECA)  and 
authorisation policies. Policies are written in terms of managed 
objects programmed in Java, which are stored in a local domain 
service. Based on our previous investigations [17], Ponder2 was 
considered to be more extensible and with better infrastructure 
support when compared to other policy frameworks. 
Resilience  mechanisms  are  represented  by  instrumented 
components  in  the  simulation  environment.  They  provide 
callback  functions  for  management  operations,  and  run 
alongside  standard  simulated  objects.  These  instrumented 
components are implemented as OMNeT++ modules, and at the 
moment most are extensions of the standard Router module (we 
plan to instrument additional modules at the upper layers of the 
protocol stack as part of our future work). 
FlowExporterMO and IntrusionDetectionMO are positioned 
above  the  network  layer,  and  receive  duplicate  packets. 
RateLimiterMO  is  placed  in-line  between  the  network  and 
physical layers. Finally,  LinkMonitorMO  was implemented by 
modifying an existing channel type, allowing us to place it at 
any position within the network topology. 
 
 
Fig.11. Integration between a network simulator and Ponder2 
Such  components  export  their  callback  functions  through 
management interfaces, which are made accessible by the policy 
decision  point  (PDP).  Communication  between  simulated 
objects and the external policy framework is implemented via 
adapter  objects,  which  abstract  invocation  details  using  the 
XMLRPC protocol. An event broker resolves and maps event 
notifications  from  inside  the  simulation  (e.g.,  anomaly 
detections, link utilization, etc) to the policy framework, which 
according to a dynamic set of policies invokes adaptive actions 
in the instrumented components running within the simulation 
(Fig.11). 
This platform permits the implementation of detection and 
remediation components both in core or edge networks. It can be 
used  to  explicitly  model  the  interactions  between  these 
mechanisms and observe how they can dynamically impact the 
operation of the network. As part of our future work we intend 
to  build  a  library  of  instrumented  resilience  components 
implementing detection and remediation mechanisms at both the 
core and the edge portions of the simulated network. 
4. MULTI-LEVEL RESILIENCE STRATEGIES 
4.1  MULTI-LEVEL WORM DETECTION 
Ultimately, multi-level resilience architecture would involve 
explicit  interactions  between  edge  and  core  mechanisms.  We 
anticipate, for example, the exchanges of “hints” between edge 
and core detection mechanisms to assist in the more effectively 
gathering of evidence for particular types of anomalies. These 
hints  may,  for  example,  cause  the  modification  of  the  set  of 
management policies enforced by the components operating in a 
specific segment of the network. Likewise, we envisage also the 
collaboration  between  remediation  mechanisms  at  different 
levels to mitigate an anomaly.  
In  order  to  demonstrate  the  feasibility  of  a  multi-level 
resilience strategy  we propose a case study based on a  worm 
propagation scenario. In this scenario, a collaborative core/edge 
methodology would employ cross-layering early detection and 
remediation  of  worm  propagation  before  its  full  effect  is 
achieved. Computer worms can quickly propagate in the Internet 
due to their self-replication capability, and severely disrupt the 
operation  of  the  network  in  particular  due  to  the  increased 
network  traffic.  Therefore  it  is  needed  to  detect  worm 
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warning  time  for  reaction  before  the  whole  network  is 
compromised.  Examples  of  particularly  disruptive  worms 
include Code Red [3], Blaster [4], Sasser [5] and Slammer [6].  
 
Fig.12. Multi-level architecture for worm detection 
Worms  typically  spread  through  the  exploitation  of 
vulnerabilities  in  the  operating  systems.  Typically,  a  worm 
presents simple attack behaviours, and all computers infected by 
this worm will send malicious traffic with statistically similar 
behaviour. It differs from other challenges to network operation, 
such as a DDoS, in the sense that a DDoS has only one or a 
small number of targets, whereas a worm has no specific target 
in the network. 
Our proposed multi-level architecture for addressing worm 
detection includes both transport layer mechanisms operating at 
the core network as well as application layer mechanisms in the 
edge network. On the one hand, the transport layer analysis will 
use entropy distributions (of src/dst ports, src/dst IP addresses, 
payload, or byte and packet sizes) as input to the Bispectrum 
analysis.  On  the  other  hand,  application  layer  analysis  will 
perform time series analysis on application-layer protocols and 
use  machine  learning  techniques  for  storing  worm  behaviour. 
The conceptual multi-level architecture for the worm scenario is 
depicted in Fig.12. This architecture relies on the cooperation 
between transport and application layer mechanisms to share and 
correlate  information  for  identifying  and  predicting  worm 
propagation. We intend to refine this architecture and simulate 
the interactions between core and edge mechanisms as part of 
our future work. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we proposed the notion of multi-level network 
resilience.  This  work  is  motivated  by  the  potential 
complementarities between the research being developed at IIT 
Madras  and  Lancaster  University,  in  order  to  provide  a 
collaborative traffic analysis and anomaly detection, combining 
mechanisms and algorithms deployed both in the core and edge 
networks. We described in this paper the current work developed 
at  IIT  Madras  and  Lancaster  on  traffic  analysis  and  anomaly 
detection, which will form the basis of a multi-level resilience 
architecture. We also outlined the simulation platform we intend 
to use to evaluate our joint work, as well as a worm propagation 
case  study  scenario  that  illustrates  how  mechanisms  from  the 
two realms can be combined. 
As part of our future work, we are going to refine the ideas 
presented in this paper and, based on the case study scenario, 
propose a multi-level architecture using a combination of traffic 
classification and detection techniques operating both at the core 
and  edge  networks.  The  simulation  platform  will  allow  us  to 
evaluate  how  network-,  transport-  and  application-layer 
mechanisms can exchange information and operate together. 
Moreover, as part of the work on the multi-level resilience 
architecture we also intend to develop a joint data-set analysis 
and  validation  of  anomaly  detection  methods  and  time  series 
models. Both IIT Madras and Lancaster use time series models 
on  different  datasets,  the  former  focusing  on  application  and 
packet data from the network edge and the latter focusing on 
network flows at the network core. Although the approaches are 
sound, promising and have established similar ground truths, it 
is still necessary to validate these approaches on common data 
sets. 
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